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A RELATIVELY greater emphasis by the Royal Society during its initial Jljl year upon the collection and validation o f factual knowledge rather than upon the establishment of theories was reported in 1667 by Thomas Sprat in his History of the Royal Society (1). There is some question whether Sprat's book represents a consensus of the Royal Society or is merely an expression of private opinion, especially with regard to the origins of the Society (2). Sprat's descrip tion of the practice of the Society does, however, agree well with the treatment given in the pages of the Philosophical Transactions to a controversy which arose over conflicting reports of a comet's position and over the nature of its path through the heavens.
According to Sprat, the Royal Society had three tasks. First, there was a preliminary collection of data. Second, there was the resolving of matter of fact, with reliance on the authority of numbers (3), by which Sprat meant the number of observers who confirmed a particular observation. Third, there was the task of conjecturing on causes, a task in which Sprat noted that the members of the Royal Society were perhaps overly cautious:
Though they are not yet very daring, in establishing conclusions; yet they lay no injunctions upon their successors not to do the same, when they shall have got a sufficient store for such a work. (4) The caution in establishing theories was probably due more to an aversion to theory, however, than to a lack of facts from which to draw conclusions, for Sprat w rote:
That a higher degree of Reputation is due to Discoveries, than to the Teachers of Speculative Doctrines, nay even the Conquerors themselves . . . (5).
He also noted that one of the purposes of the Royal Society was to preserve knowledge of nature 'from being straitned and bounded too much up by General Doctrines' (6).
The reluctance to become entangled, in speculative doctrine and the reliance on the authority o f numbers in resolving matter of fact are both illustrated by the controversy over comets.
An attempt to establish a theory regarding comets did appear in the pages of the Philosophical T r a n s a c t i o n s . In the first number of the journal there report of a pamphlet received from the French astronomer and mathematician Adrien Auzout in which he predicted the ephemerides of the first of the two comets of 1665 from an hypothesis later to be revealed: that comets revolved in large circular orbits. It was suggested, since Auzout s hypothesis of the motion was based on only four or five observations, that the virtuosi of England might compare their observations either to confirm the hypothesis or to undeceive Monsieur Auzout if he were mistaken. The review of Auzout s pamphlet repeated the prediction of the comet's path, including Auzout's hope that someone in Madagascar and someone in Guiana had observed the comet, these being the places from which he expected the comet to be first and last seen. Auzout concluded that, if other observations fell within the range guessed by him, he might be able to determine the distance of the comet, and if not he was ready to listen to other hypotheses than his own which could explain the appearances (7). W ith the occurrence of a second comet that year, Auzout again appealed for more observations (8).
W hat had begun as an attempt to confirm or to refute an hypothesis about the nature of comet paths was soon restricted, however, to a question of fact to be resolved by the authority of numbers. John Hevelius of Danzig, in an account o f his own observations of the first comet of 1665, had concluded that the apparent motion of the comet deviated considerably from that predicted by Auzout's hypothesis. The review of Hevelius's book in the Philosophical Trans actions also reported Auzout's reaction. O f the mistakes in Hevelius s book, Auzout had singled out as the most considerable the reported position o f the comet on the night of 18 February. Hevelius had placed the comet at the first star in Aries; Auzout contended that the comet had been at least i°i7' away from that star on 17 February and only some 12' or 13' closer on 19 February (he had missed observing the comet on 18 February) (9).
The reviewer for the Philosophical Transactions joined Auzout in focusing attention on the issue of one particular observation rather than on the more general problem of validating an hypothesis. Following the review of Hevelius's book and Auzout's criticism, there appeared the suggestion that the important difference between the two be submitted to the ablest philosophers and astron omers of England. By comparing Auzout's and Hevelius's reports with English observations, the Royal Society hoped 'very likely to discern where the mistake 1 0 4 lies, and having discern d it, will certainly be found highly impartial and ingenuous in giving their sense o f the same' (io).
O f the two opponents, we know that at least Hevelius accepted the role o f the Royal Society as arbiter. In his D e s cp ublished later i same year and reviewed in the Philosophical Transactions, he tried to justify his account o f the comet. He discussed his w ork in more detail to show that he had not erred in his observations o f 18 February, nor had he been deluded by any fixed star. He left it to the Learned W orld, and particularly to the Royal Society, after they shall have well examined and considered all his Observations and the Calculus raised therefrom, to judge o f this, and the other particulars in the controversie' (n ).
Perhaps Hevelius later regretted submitting the dispute to the Royal Society, because the judgm ent o f the English astronomers was against him. Having consulted the observations o f some astronomers who had observed the comet, the unnamed group o f English astronomers who had undertaken the examination o f the dispute concluded that whatever Hevelius had seen on the night o f 18 February near the first star o f Aries, it had not been the comet. Trans., I, 150-151 (1665).
